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Abstract
This paper studies the choice of an individual who acquires information before
choosing an action from a set of actions, whose consequences depend on the
realization of a state of nature. Information processing can be costly, for ex-
ample, due to limited attention. We show that the preference of the individual
is completely characterized by a preference for early resolution of uncertainty,
which becomes indifference when facing degenerate choices. When informa-
tion acquisition is no longer part of the decision process, the individual is in-
different to the timing of resolution of uncertainty and she behaves according
to the subjective learning model of Dillenberger et al. (2014).
Keywords: Costly Information Acquisition, Menu Choice, Rational
Inattention, Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty
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1. Introduction
Information, uncertainty and time are the essential dimensions of most
economic decisions. Typically, information is used to reduce uncertainty and
uncertainty resolves over time. In many situations, however, acquiring infor-
mation may be costly: for example, when individuals have bounded computa-
tional abilities. The present paper studies the interaction of time, uncertainty
and costly information acquisition.
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Consider an American tourist who is willing to visit one European country,
either Greece (G) or Italy (I ). Imagine them as "menus of actions". For example
the actions in G may be {Kos, Athens} and the actions in I may be {Florence,
Venice, Rome}. The payoff of each action depends on the state of nature that
will realize: the weather. The choice of the destination, G or I , depends on the
exchange rate between the dollar and the Euro.2 The tourist wants to acquire
information about the weather forecasts to select the best option from each
menu and she may allocate attention to different web’s sites. She can do it in
two different ways
1. Before observing the exchange rate
2. After observing the exchange rate
In the first case, she will acquire information concerning the weather forecasts
of both Greece and Italy and she will schedule her trip contingently to the ex-
change rate. If she observes the exchange rate before acquiring information,
she will pay attention only to the weather forecast that is relevant to the loca-
tion she will visit. It is reasonable to imagine that an individual who pays a cost
to acquire information will prefer to observe the exchange rate before bearing
that cost. The result of the paper establishes that this is essentially the only
consideration of an individual who pays a cost to acquire information. In other
words, we interpret uncertainty resolving before information acquisition (as in
2.), as early resolution of uncertainty. Whereas, late resolution corresponds to
a randomization device (the exchange rate) that resolves its uncertainty after
information is acquired. We show that the preference over menus of actions of
an individual who acquires costly information, is characterized by a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty, which becomes indifference when the de-
cision is degenerate. This last consideration follows from the interpretation of
the information acquisition problem: information is instrumental to perform a
better choice from the menu, when the menu contains a single action there is
no choice to make.
In addition, when the individual is indifferent toward the timing of resolu-
tion of uncertainty, i.e. indifference between observing the exchange rate be-
fore or after scheduling her vacation, her preferences are represented by the
Subjective Learning model of Dillenberger et al. (2014).
2For example, if the rate is higher than a given threshold, the tourist will choose G , otherwise
she will choose I . Let assume that, with probability α, the rate is higher than the threshold.
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With respect to the standing literature, the current paper identifies the con-
ditions concerning preferences for the timing of resolution of uncertainty, which
are necessary and sufficient to characterize Costly Information Acquisition (CIA).
Indeed, as shown in Ex. 1, an alternative property, often interpreted as repre-
senting "preference for early resolution of uncertainty", may be too weak to
characterize CIA.
The results of the paper raise questions concerning observational distin-
guishability of a model of costly information acquisition from a pure preference
for the timing of resolution of uncertainty. As pointed out above, information
is instrumental to select the best action from a menu of actions. When facing
degenerate menus, i.e. singletons, costly information acquisition is not effec-
tive. Therefore, the timing of resolution of uncertainty for choices from degen-
erate menus is irrelevant. This implies that CIA is distinguishable from a pure
preference for early resolution of uncertainty. This distinction can be used to
experimentally discriminate the CIA model from those valuing early resolution
of uncertainty intrinsically.
Concerning the Subjective Learning model, there is no observational dis-
tinguishability from a pure indifference toward the timing of resolution of un-
certainty.
2. Overview of the results
An individual with CIA preferences optimally chooses an act f from a set of
acts F . Each act associates a payoff f (ω) ∈ X to the state of the worldω ∈Ω that
will realize. Information about the true state of the world is acquired through a
signal (or experiment) at a cost c. The signal specifies the probability of forming
a posterior p given a prior pˆ. After information is received, the decision maker
selects an act from the menu. The problem can be formulated as:
max
pi∈Π(pˆ)
[∫
∆(Ω)
max
f ∈F
(∫
Ω
u( f (ω)) p(dω)
)
pi(d p)− c(pi)
]
(CIA)
where u : X →R is a utility over the payoffs in X ,Π(pˆ) is the set of all signals for
a given prior pˆ and c :Π(pˆ)→ [0,∞] is the cost of information.
The CIA model has been axiomatized by De Oliveira et al. (2014) and it is in-
terpreted as representing the preferences of a Rationally Inattentive individual
(in the sense of Sims, 2003). The timing of the rational inattentive choice pro-
cedure is the following: an unobservable (to the decision maker) state of the
world is selected by nature, the decision maker chooses a menu from which
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she will select an act later. After choosing a menu, information is acquired and
the posterior is formed. Lastly, the individual selects an act from the menu
and she receives the payoff associated with the state of the world and the se-
lected act. The decision maker may also face randomized menus (as in the ex-
change rate example),αF+(1−α)G . In this case, she chooses a contingent plan
f ∈ F and g ∈ G , and a randomization device determines which of them will
be implemented. f ∈ F with probability α and g ∈ G with probability (1−α).
For randomized menus there are two layers of uncertainty: the state of the
world and the realization of the randomization device. In the axiomatization of
De Oliveira et al. (2014), the realization of the randomization device is known to
the individual only after information is acquired. Hence, the individual always
sets up a contingent plan of actions. In the present work, we assume a more
Choice
of an act
LRUERU
Information
acquisition
Choice
of a menu
Figure 1: Early (ERU) and late (LRU) resolution of uncertainty
general domain in which revealed preferences are observed. Our setting allows
to distinguish between later and earlier resolution of uncertainty. Indeed, our
primitive is a preference over lotteries over menus of acts. We allow for a differ-
ent form of randomization between menus that resolves its uncertainty before
information is acquired. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the decision process
in the two cases. LRU is the point in time at which randomization takes place
in De Oliveira et al. (2014), we allow an additional form of randomization that
resolves its uncertainty at ERU.
As in Ergin and Sarver (2015), the early randomization3 is modeled through
the lottery αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG . With probability α, it pays a degenerate lottery de-
livering F , with probability 1−α it pays a degenerate lottery delivering G and
it is played immediately. It corresponds to the left-hand side of Fig. 2. In this
case, the individual knows the menu from which she will choose in the second
stage, before acquiring information.
Differently, when facing δαF+(1−α)G the individual acquires information to
3The mixture operator ⊕ represents mixture of lotteries, whereas the symbol + mixture of
menus (see Section 3).
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Figure 2: Early resolution of uncertainty (left) and late resolution of uncertainty (right).
perform contingent choices from menus and the realization of the randomiza-
tion device determines which plan will be implemented.
It is easy to see that a CIA individual will prefer the left-hand side to the
right-hand side of Fig. 2. This is due to the cost of acquiring information, since
the choice in the right-hand side of Figure 2 is "more complex" in terms of the
amount of information to analyze, hence more costly.
The opposite implication, that preferring the left-hand side to the right-
hand side of Figure 2 implies CIA is, however, not true in general. As claimed
above, when facing randomization between degenerate menus, the acquisition
of information becomes superfluous, since information is used to perform an
optimal choice from the menu. Therefore, denoting by f the degenerate menu{
f
}
, the CIA model implies αδ f ⊕ (1−α)δg ∼ δα f +(1−α)g . This is not necessar-
ily true for a pure preference for early resolution of uncertainty: in that case,
an intrinsic preference for early resolution of uncertainty may follow from al-
ternative reasons such as, anxiety or the possibility to take hidden actions (see
Ergin and Sarver (2015)), hence a strict preference αδ f ⊕ (1−α)δg Â δα f +(1−α)g
is possible. Theorem 1 establishes that the CIA model is completely character-
ized by the existence of a strict preference for early resolution of uncertainty
when non-degenerate menus are taken into account.4
4For some F,G ∈A with |F | > 1 and |G| > 1 and α ∈ (0,1), αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG Â δαF+(1−α)G
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When indifference toward the timing of resolution of uncertainty is extended
to all menus,αδF⊕(1−α)δG ∼ δαF+(1−α)G , preferences are represented by a par-
ticular case of CIA, namely the Subjective Learning (SL) model of Dillenberger
et al. (2014). In the SL model, information is exogenously fixed, therefore it is
not part of the decision problem. In the initial example, the American tourist is
indifferent between knowing the exchange rate before or after acquiring infor-
mation, if she can only gather information concerning the weather forecasts of
a single country, for example Greece.
As a final result, we prove that the attitude toward the timing of resolution
of uncertainty is related to the solution of the optimal information acquisition
problem. Suppose there exists a source of information (a signal) pi∗ that solves
the maximization in Eq. (CIA) for two menus F and G . If this is the case, the
individual is indifferent between acquiring information before or after the ran-
domization between F and G , i.e. αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG ∼ δαF+(1−α)G . In other words,
she "locally" behaves according to the SL model, since she can always acquire
pi∗.
2.1. Related literature
The acquisition of information may be costly for a variety of reasons. One of
these, limited attention, has been recently studied by different authors. It was
introduced with a series of papers by C. Sims (Sims, 1998, 2003) as a natural
explanation for price stickiness. The model has been subsequently applied to a
variety of topics.5
The behavioral foundation of the rational inattention model has been stud-
ied over the last years. Recently, Caplin and Dean (2015) and Ellis (2013) char-
acterize rational inattentive preferences observing ex post choices from menus
of alternatives. Masatlioglu et al. (2012) studied how attention is revealed from
choice. Ergin and Sarver (2010a) studied the problem of costly information ac-
quisition when the uncertainty is completely subjective, i.e. uncertainty about
future tastes. Recently, Piermont et al. (2015) studied responsive learning, where
an individual dynamically learns about her tastes through consumption. Dif-
ferently from rational inattention, consumption affects information acquisi-
tion hence, the cost of information is represented by foregone consumption.
5Price setting (Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), optimal consumption/saving (Luo,
2008; Tutino, 2008), business cycles (Kacperczyk et al., 2009), portfolio under-diversification
(Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009), asset pricing (Mondria, 2010), stochastic choice
(Mate˘jka and McKay, 2015).
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In the current paper, the primitive is a preference over lotteries over menus
of acts and we do not assume observability of choices from menus. The closest
paper to the current one is De Oliveira et al. (2014), although their primitive is
a preference over menus of actions. The focus of the current paper is to pro-
vide an alternative behavioral foundation of the same model, relying on the
distinction between early and late resolution of uncertainty. A full compari-
son with De Oliveira et al. (2014) is discussed in Section 3.2. De Oliveira (2014)
characterizes a particular case of the CIA model, with an entropic cost of atten-
tion that corresponds to the formulation of the RI model originally proposed by
Sims (2003).
Dillenberger et al. (2014) axiomatized another particular case of the CIA
model, called Subjective Learning (SL), where information is exogenously fixed.
In this work we give an alternative axiomatization of the SL model.
From the technical viewpoint, this paper modifies the approach of De Oliveira
et al. (2014) and Dillenberger et al. (2014) introducing an explicit distinction be-
tween early and late resolution of uncertainty, in the spirit of Kreps and Porteus
(1978). The current paper is also related to the work of Ergin and Sarver (2015).
They study intrinsic preference for early resolution of uncertainty when choices
are observed over lotteries over menus of lotteries. In their model (second-
stage) uncertainty is subjective since there are no "objective" states of the world.
A full comparison with their work is contained in Section 3.3.
3. Axioms
A finite set Ω contains the states of the world, when a state is realized, all
uncertainty is resolved. We denote by X the set of consequences, it is a convex
subset of a topological vector space. An act is a function f :Ω→ X , the set of
all acts is denoted byF . A constant act f (ω)= x for all ω ∈Ω is identified with
an element of X . We denote by A the set of all nonempty and finite subsets
ofF . Given a topological space M , we denote by ∆(M) the set of probabilities
defined on the Borel σ-algebra of M , endowed with the weak* topology. The
binary relation< representing preferences is defined over lotteries over menus
of acts i.e. on∆(A ). ⊕ denotes the standard mixture of two lotteries. We denote
by f the singleton menu F = { f }. x denotes the singleton menu containing only
a constant act f (ω)= x for allω ∈Ω and some x ∈ X . δF denotes the degenerate
lottery paying F ∈A for sure. The mixture + of two acts, α f + (1−α)g for all
α ∈ [0,1] is performed state-wise, (α f + (1−α)g )(ω)=α f (ω)+ (1−α)g (ω). The
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mixture of two menus αF + (1−α)G for all α ∈ [0,1] is the menu of all mixtures
of elements in F and G , αF + (1−α)G = {α f + (1−α)g : f ∈ F, g ∈G}.
The first axiom includes some standard properties whose interpretation is
well established.
Axiom (Preference).
1. (Weak Order) < is a non-trivial weak order.
2. (Continuity) For all P,Q,R ∈∆(A ), the sets {α ∈ [0,1] :αP ⊕ (1−α)Q <R} and{
α ∈ [0,1] : R <αP ⊕ (1−α)Q} are closed.
3. (Dominance) For all menus F ∈A and acts g ∈F , δF∪g < δF , with δF∪g ∼
δF if there is f ∈ F such that δ f (ω)< δg (ω) for each ω ∈Ω.
4. (Unboundedness) There are x, y ∈ X with x Â y, such that for all α ∈ (0,1),
there exist z, z ′ ∈ X such that δαz+(1−α)y Â δx Â δαz ′+(1−α)y .
Weak Order and Continuity are minimal rationality and continuity require-
ments. Dominance is introduced (in their setting) by De Oliveira et al. (2014),
it implies a preference for flexibility, i.e. G ⊆ F implies δF < δG , and the mono-
tonicity axiom used in choice under ambiguity i.e. δ f (ω) < δg (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
implies δ f < δg . Unboundedness implies that u(X )=R, it only restricts prefer-
ences over final prizes.6
The next axiom is the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern independence:
Axiom (Ex-ante Independence). For any P,Q,R ∈∆(A ) and α ∈ (0,1),
P <Q ⇐⇒ αP ⊕ (1−α)R <αQ⊕ (1−α)R
The interpretation is standard, a preference for a lottery P over Q is not re-
versed when mixing with a third lottery.
The next definition formally introduces the preference for early resolution
of uncertainty (PERU), (see Ergin and Sarver (2015)).
6Unboundedness is a technical requirement and it is a fairly common assumption (see
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b); De Oliveira et al. (2014)). It implies the existence of arbitrarily
good and arbitrarily bad outcomes. For example, if X is the set of simple lotteries over mone-
tary prizes, unboundedness is satisfied when the individual’s risk attitude is represented by a
logarithmic utility. De Oliveira et al. (2014) assume unboundedness above or below, we assume
unboundedness above and below.
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(PERU). For any F,G ∈A and α ∈ (0,1),
αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG < δαF+(1−α)G
It implies that the left "tree" of Figure 2 is weakly preferred to the right one.
Similarly, we define indifference toward the timing of resolution of uncer-
tainty:
(ITRU). For any F,G ∈A and α ∈ (0,1),
αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG ∼ δαF+(1−α)G
Next property imposes ITRU only with respect to lotteries involving degen-
erate menus, we name it Degenerate ITRU, more precisely:
(DITRU). For any f , g ∈F and α ∈ (0,1),
αδ f ⊕ (1−α)δg ∼ δα f +(1−α)g
Before stating the main theorem, we formally introduce the Costly Informa-
tion Acquisition (CIA) and the Subjective Learning (SL) representations of pref-
erences. First, we need some preliminary definitions. The individual has a prior
pˆ ∈ ∆(Ω) representing her belief. Information acquisition is modeled through
the observation of a noisy signal and the formation of a posterior p ∈ ∆(Ω).
Each signal induces a distribution over posteriors pi ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)), with the prop-
erty that the expected posterior equals the prior. We identify a signal with the
distribution it induces over posteriors. Hence, for a given prior pˆ, the convex
set of signals is given by the following:
Π(pˆ)=
{
pi ∈∆(∆(Ω)) :
∫
∆(Ω)
p pi(d p)= pˆ
}
The next definition introduces the information cost function:
Definition 1. Given a prior pˆ ∈∆(Ω), a function c :Π(pˆ)→ [0,∞] is an informa-
tion cost function if it is lower semicontinuous and it satisfies:
(i) c(pi)= 0 whenever pi(pˆ)= 1.
(ii) c(αpi+ (1−α)ρ)≤αc(pi)+ (1−α)c(ρ) for all pi,ρ ∈Π(pˆ) and α ∈ (0,1).
(iii) c(ρ) ≤ c(pi) for all pi,ρ ∈ Π(pˆ) and ∫∆(Ω)σ(p)pi(d p) ≥ ∫∆(Ω)σ(p)dρ(p) for
all convex and continuous σ :∆(Ω)→R.
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Property (i) states that acquiring no information is costless. Property (ii) and
lower semicontinuity are regularity conditions satisfied by most cost functions
used in the literature (e.g. Shannon Information). Condition (iii) states that
more informative signals (in the sense of Blackwell) are more costly.
Definition 2. A binary relation< has a Costly Information Acquisition represen-
tation if, there exists a tuple (V ,Π(pˆ), pˆ,u,c), whereΠ(pˆ)⊂∆(∆(Ω)) is a set of sig-
nals, pˆ ∈∆(Ω) is a prior, u : X → R is a Bernoulli utility and c :∆(∆(Ω))→ [0,∞]
is an information cost function and V :A → R is such that, for all P,Q ∈ ∆(A ),
P <Q ⇐⇒ EP [V ]≥ EQ [V ] and
V (F )= max
pi∈Π(pˆ)
[∫
∆(Ω)
max
f ∈F
(∫
Ω
u ◦ f d p
)
dpi− c(pi)
]
The Subjective Learning representation of Dillenberger et al. (2014) is a par-
ticular case of the CIA representation in which information is exogenously fixed.
Formally,
Definition 3. A binary relation < has a Subjective Learning representation if,
there exists a tuple (V ,pi,u) where,pi ∈∆(∆(Ω)) is a signal, u : X →R is a Bernoulli
utility and V :A →R is such that, for all P,Q ∈∆(A ), P <Q ⇐⇒ EP [V ]≥ EQ [V ]
and
V (F )=
∫
∆(Ω)
max
f ∈F
(∫
Ω
u ◦ f d p
)
dpi
In the Subjective Learning model, the choice of information is not part of
the decision process.
The next theorem is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 1. Given a binary relation< on ∆(A ):
1. < satisfies Preference, Ex-ante Independence, PERU and DITRU, if and
only if,< has a Costly Information Acquisition representation.
2. < satisfies Preference, Ex-ante Independence and ITRU, if and only if, <
has a Subjective Learning representation.
Theorem 1 characterizes the relation between attitude toward the timing of
resolution of uncertainty and the costly acquisition of information. A prefer-
ence for early resolution, which becomes indifference when restricted to de-
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generate menus, characterizes the costly information acquisition model.7 In-
deed, when mixing singletons, the timing of resolution of uncertainty is inef-
fective. This is a natural consequence of the information acquisition problem
modelled by CIA. When facing two degenerate menus of acts, information is
not valuable, since information is instrumental to perform an optimal choice
from the menu. For singleton menus there is no gain in acquiring information.
As a consequence, costly information acquisition does not play a role in this sit-
uation. This is the main difference between the CIA representation and a pure
preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
When the timing of resolution of uncertainty is not relevant (e.g. ITRU),
the preference is represented by the Subjective Learning model. The individual
acquires information observing the exogenous signal pi.
To highlight the strength of PERU we provide a different axiomatization of
the CIA model that is more directly comparable with that of De Oliveira et al.
(2014). Indeed, although PERU can be compared with Axiom 6 (Aversion to
Randomization) in De Oliveira et al. (2014), DITRU is difficult to compare to
Axiom 4 (Weak Singleton Independence).8 In our alternative axiomatization,
we assume PERU and we relax Axiom 4 (WSI) to Weak Degenerate Indepen-
dence. The latter imposes independence for ex post mixtures when restricted
to singletons hence, it is strictly weaker than WSI (see also Section 3.2):
Axiom (Weak Degenerate Independence (WDI)). For any f , g ,h,h′ ∈F andα ∈
(0,1),
δα f +(1−α)h < δαg+(1−α)h =⇒ δα f +(1−α)h′ < δαg+(1−α)h′
Then, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. A binary relation < satisfies axioms Preference, Ex-ante Indepen-
dence, WDI and PERU, if and only if, < has a Costly Information Acquisition
representation.
It follows from the previous corollary that the weakening of Axiom 4 (WSI)
of De Oliveira et al. (2014) to the WDI axiom can be compensated by the addi-
tional strength of PERU, with respect to Axiom 6 (Aversion to Randomization)
7More precisely, the CIA model is characterized by PERU with, at least, one strict preference.
8WSI (Axiom 4) postulates that, for all menus F,G , all α ∈ (0,1) and all acts h,h′, αF + (1−
α)h < αG + (1−α)h ⇒ αF + (1−α)h′ < αG + (1−α)h′. In our setting it would be: for all
F,G ∈A and h,h′ ∈F and all α ∈ (0,1), δαF+(1−α)h < δαG+(1−α)h ⇒ δαF+(1−α)h′ < δαG+(1−α)h′ .
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in De Oliveira et al. (2014). In other words, we derive from PERU, WDI and Ex-
ante Independence their Axiom 4 (WSI), rather than assuming it.
3.1. Optimal information and ITRU
In this section we show that the optimal signals associated to a given menu,
i.e. the ones solving the optimization problem in (CIA), convey information
about the attitude toward the resolution of uncertainty. In particular, if two
menus share an optimizing signal, then the individual is indifferent to mixing
them before or after acquiring information. More precisely, consider the set of
optimal signals for a given menu F ∈A ,
∂V (F )= argmax
pi∈Π(pˆ)
[∫
∆(Ω)
max
f ∈F
(∫
Ω
u ◦ f d p
)
dpi− c(pi)
]
and take two menus F,G ∈A . If there exists a signal pi∗ belonging to ∂V (F ) and
to ∂V (G), it means that the optimal information acquisition related to F and
the one related to G have, at least, a common solution. The mere existence of
such signal is sufficient to impose indifference toward the timing of random-
ization, when it involves F and G . Intuitively, if pi∗ is optimal for both F and G ,
the individual can always acquire pi∗, so she is indifferent to the timing of the
randomization, as in the SL model. More precisely:
Proposition 1. Suppose that< has a CIA representation, then the following are
equivalent:
1. ∂V (F )∩∂V (G) 6= ;
2. αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG ∼ δαF+(1−α)G for all α ∈ (0,1).
The result does not imply that the individual will necessarily acquire pi∗
when evaluating F and G . However, the existence of a common optimal sig-
nal is sufficient to guarantee indifference. After all, the individual can always
acquire pi∗. The opposite of condition 2. in Proposition 1, has been interpreted
in De Oliveira et al. (2014) as a "reallocation of attention between F and G",
that is, the tendency to focus on different sources of informations depending
on their relevance when facing different menus. This can be used to extend
their comparative static analysis. Suppose we can observe the preferences <1
and<2 of two individuals and assume V1 and V2 are their representations. The
following definition can be found in De Oliveira et al. (2014):
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Definition 4. V1 has a greater tendency to reallocate attention than V2 if, for all
menus F,G ∈A , ∂V2(F )∩∂V2(G)=; implies ∂V1(F )∩∂V1(G)=;.
The following is a comparative notion of preference for early resolution of
uncertainty.
Definition 5. V1 has a greater preference for early resolution of uncertainty than
V2 if, for all menus F,G ∈A :
αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG Â2 δαF+(1−α)G =⇒ αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG Â1 δαF+(1−α)G
Whenever individual 2 strictly prefers early resolution of uncertainty, so
does individual 1. The following theorem establishes an equivalence between
greater tendency to relocate attention and greater preference for early resolu-
tion of uncertainty.
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent:
1. V1 has a greater preference for early resolution of uncertainty than V2.
2. V1 has a greater tendency to reallocate attention than V2.
The two conditions are equivalent, indeed, as proved in De Oliveira et al.
(2014), a tendency to reallocate attention is related to a form of preference for
early resolution of uncertainty (as defined in their condition (ii) of Proposition
3).
3.2. Relation with De Oliveira et al. (2014)
De Oliveira et al. (2014) proposed an axiomatization of the CIA model that
is the starting point of the present work. There are, however, some substantial
differences. First, we based our axiomatic on the distinction between early and
late resolution of ex-ante uncertainty. Indeed, our setting allows to distinguish
between randomizations taking place before or after information is acquired.
The main axioms in our representation are PERU and DITRU. They capture the
attitude toward the timing of resolution of uncertainty for a CIA individual. In
their work, De Oliveira et al. (2014) introduced a weak form of preference for
early resolution of uncertainty, Axiom 6 (Aversion to Randomization). It postu-
lates that, if F ∼G , then F <αF + (1−α)G , in our setting this would be equiva-
lent to δF ∼ δG implies δF < δαF+(1−α)G . When the agent is indifferent between
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two menus, she may strictly prefer to commit to one menu rather than random-
izing. Although this is a weak form9 of preference for "early resolution of uncer-
tainty", in their setting there is no explicit modeling of the timing of resolution
of uncertainty since, the randomization takes place always after information
is acquired (attention is allocated). Moreover, the previous axiom is sufficient
to characterize the CIA representation only when coupled with their Axiom 4
(Weak Singleton Independence). To see that Aversion to Randomization does
not characterize CIA, consider the following example:
Example 1. Let ci (pi) : ∆(∆(Ω)) → [0,∞] be information costs, for i = 1,2, such
that maxpi∈Π(pˆ)
[
1
ci (pi)
]
= 1 for i = 1,2. Define:
V (F )= max
pi∈Π(pˆ)
[(∫
max f ∈F
(∫
u( f )d p
)
pi(d p)
)+
c1(pi)
−
(∫
max f ∈F
(∫
u( f )d p
)
pi(d p)
)−
c2(pi)
]
where (·)+ and (·)− denote the positive and negative part. V has the following
properties (see Section AppendixB.1): it satisfies Axioms 6 (AR) in De Oliveira
et al. (2014), it satisfies DITRU, it violates Axiom 4 (WSI) in De Oliveira et al.
(2014) and it violates PERU10.
Example 1 provides a representation of preferences that is not a CIA model
(since the cost of information is multiplicative, hence it violates Axiom 4 (WSI)
in De Oliveira et al. (2014)) and satisfies DITRU (and WDI) and Axiom 6 (AR).
To the contrary, it does not satisfy PERU. Assuming PERU in Example 1 would
imply the existence of an alternative representation of V of the CIA form. Ex-
ample 1 shows that, even when DITRU (or WDI) holds, Axiom 6 (AR) alone may
not be sufficient to characterize CIA. The additional power of Axiom 4 (WSI)
is needed. This is clear from our second axiomatization (Corollary 1), where
we show the sufficiency of PERU (and Ex-ante Independence) in characterizing
the CIA model. We assumed Weak Degenerate Independence, rather than Ax-
iom 4 (WSI) in De Oliveira et al. (2014) and PERU, rather than Axiom 6 (AR) in
De Oliveira et al. (2014) and we derive the CIA representation. In other words,
the strength of PERU can compensate the weakening of WSI to WDI. Summing
9To see that Ex-ante Independence and PERU imply Aversion to Randomization, suppose
δF ∼ δG , by Ex-ante independence, αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG ∼ δG , by PERU, δG < δαF+(1−α)G .
10The functional V is quasi-convex and positively homogeneous. It is convex (hence it would
satisfy PERU), if and only if, c1 ≤ c2 (see (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011a, Prop. 6).)
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up, in our richer setting and given Axiom Preference and Ex-ante Indepen-
dence, the CIA model can be essentially characterized by one of the following
pairs of axioms: Axiom 6 (Aversion to Randomization) and Axiom 4 (Weak Sin-
gleton Independence), as in De Oliveira et al. (2014), PERU and DITRU (Theo-
rem 1), PERU and Weak Degenerate Independence (Corollary 1).
To conclude, our axiomatizations constitute an alternative to the one pro-
posed in De Oliveira et al. (2014). We focus on the effect that the timing of
resolution of uncertainty has on preferences when information is costly. It is
meant to link two different branches of literature and to give a complete anal-
ysis of the relation between costly information acquisition and the preference
for early resolution of uncertainty.
3.3. Relation with Ergin and Sarver (2015)
The approach we use in this paper is related to a recent work of Ergin and
Sarver (2015). They studied preferences toward the timing of resolution of un-
certainty when the objects of choice are lotteries over menus of lotteries. Their
representation is formally similar to the one in Definition 2 and it ranks lotteries
over menus of lotteries according to P 7→ EP [V ] where:
V (F )=max
θ∈Θ
∫
S
max
β∈F
u(β, s;θ)pi(d s,θ)− c(θ)
where Θ is interpreted as a set of hidden actions a decision maker could take
before the resolution of uncertainty. They also impose additional axioms to
specialize the previous representation to the Costly Contemplation representa-
tion introduced in Ergin and Sarver (2010a). In that case, θ ∈ Θ are "contem-
plation strategies", i.e. observations of a signal about the state space. This last
representation is the closest to the one studied in this work. There are, how-
ever, some important differences: first, (ex post) uncertainty in Ergin and Sarver
(2015) is subjective. In their work, menus contain objective lotteries and the
probabilities pi(·,θ) are defined over future von Neumann-Morgenstern prefer-
ences, as typically studied in preference over menus of lotteries. In this work,
we assume the existence of an objective state space Ω and a decision maker
who acquires information to form a posterior over Ω and choose from menus
of Anscombe-Aumann acts: functions from the objective state space to conse-
quences. Therefore, information is used to update a prior over an "exogenous"
state space Ω, rather than updating a prior over an "endogenous" space S of
future tastes. In the present work, as well as in that of De Oliveira et al. (2014),
tastes are fixed (u is unique) and the preference for flexibility, postulated by the
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Dominance axiom, follows from possible gains due to information acquisition
(see also the discussion in De Oliveira et al. (2014)).
The second main distinction concerns the separation of tastes and beliefs.
We derive a representation that separates tastes and beliefs, something that is
not possible in the setting of Ergin and Sarver (2015). Their Costly Contem-
plation identifies a unique set of measures that they interpret as contempla-
tion strategies. However, the separate identification of utilities and probabili-
ties cannot be achieved, due to state-dependence of the utilities u(·, s;θ) (see
Ergin and Sarver, 2015, Pag. 517).
In addition, the same discussion on the role of Blackwell order contained in
De Oliveira et al. (2014) applies here. In the CIA model, the Blackwell order has
a central role in the identification of the cost function (De Oliveira et al., 2014,
Section 3.3 in) and in the comparative static analysis of "attentiveness" (Section
3.4 in De Oliveira et al., 2014). The use of Blackwell order has no counterpart in
the work of Ergin and Sarver (2015).
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AppendixA. Preliminaries
For completeness, we introduce some notation taken from De Oliveira et al.
(2014). C (∆(Ω)) is the linear space of continuous real-valued function defined
on ∆(Ω). ca(∆(Ω)) is the linear space of signed measures of bounded variation
defined on ∆(Ω). C (∆(Ω)) is equipped with the supnorm and ca(∆) with the
weak* topology. ca(∆(Ω)) is the continuous dual of C (∆(Ω)). We denote by Φ
the set of convex functions in C (∆(Ω)), it is a closed convex cone containing the
zero function.
A functional W : C (∆(Ω)) → R is said to be normalized if W (k) = k for all
k ∈ R (where we identify the constant function 1∆(Ω)k with k); monotone, if
W (a) ≥ W (b) whenever a(p) ≥ b(p) for all p ∈ ∆(Ω); translation invariant if
W (a+k)=W (a)+k for all k ∈R. A translation invariant functional is (Lipschitz)
continuous.
The next proposition will be useful in the proof of the main theorem. Let
Γ⊆C (∆(Ω)), such that Γ is convex and Γ= Γ+R.
Proposition 2. A convex, continuous and normalized functionals W : Γ→ R is
translation invariant.
Proof. Of Proposition 2. By convexity and normalization, for σ ∈ Γ and k ∈R,
W (σ+k)=W
(
α
σ
α
+ (1−α) k
(1−α)
)
≤αW
(σ
α
)
+ (1−α)W
(
k
1−α
)
=αW
(σ
α
)
+ (1−α) k
1−α
since it is true for all α ∈ (0,1), by continuity, it is true as α→ 1, then,
W (σ+k)≤W (σ)+k
For any σ ∈ Γ and k ∈R,
W (σ+k)≤W (σ)+k =W (σ+k−k)+k
≤W (σ+k)−k+k =W (σ+k)
Then W (σ+k)=W (σ)+k for all σ ∈ Γ and k ∈R.
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Given an affine utility u : X →R, we denote by σF :∆(Ω)→R, the function
σF (p)=max
f ∈F
∫
Ω
u ◦ f d p ∀p ∈∆(Ω) (A.1)
for some finite menu F . The set of such functions is denoted by Φˆ. If u(X )=R,
Φˆ has the following properties (De Oliveira et al., 2014).
1. Φˆ+R= Φˆ.
2. Φˆ+R is dense inΦ.
AppendixB. Proofs
By the Mixture Space theorem (Herstein and Milnor, 1953), axioms Weak
Order, Continuity and Ex-ante Independence are necessary and sufficient to
the existence of a continuous function V :A →R such that
P <Q ⇐⇒ EP [V ]≥ EQ [V ]
Proof. Of Theorem 1. Part 1. The fact that a preference with a CIA representa-
tion implies the axioms is straightforward. To prove the converse implication
of Theorem 1 we need a series of preliminary results.
The next lemma introduces a representation of< over degenerate menus:
Lemma 1. There exists an affine utility u : X → R with unbounded (above and
below) range and a probability pˆ ∈∆(Ω) such that
V
(
f
)= ∫
Ω
u( f (ω))pˆ(dω)
represents < over ∆(F ). Moreover, pˆ is unique and u is unique up to positive
affine transformations.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. The result follows from (Maccheroni et al., 2006,
Corollary 20), once we prove that δ f ∼ δg implies δγ f +(1−γ)g ∼ δ f for all γ ∈
(0,1). Suppose δ f ∼ δg , by Ex-ante Independence, for all H ∈A and γ ∈ (0,1),
γδ f ⊕(1−γ)δH ∼ γδg⊕(1−γ)δH . Considering all the singletons γδ f ⊕(1−γ)δh ∼
γδg ⊕ (1−γ)δh then, by DITRU, δγ f +(1−γ)h ∼ δγg+(1−γ)h . Hence < satisfies the
condition of (Maccheroni et al., 2006, Corollary 20). The uniqueness part and
unboundedness above and below of the function u follow from standard argu-
ments (see Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011b).
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Lemma 2. For each F ∈A , there exists a xF ∈ X such that δF ∼ δxF .
Proof. Of Lemma 2. Since Ω and F are finite, there exist a best outcome b ∈ X
and a worst outcome w ∈ X such that δb < δF < δw . By (Herstein and Milnor,
1953, Th. 1) there exists γˆ ∈ [0,1] such that γˆδb ⊕ (1− γˆ)δw ∼ δF . By DITRU
δγˆb+(1−γˆ)w ∼ δF .
Now, let’s define the functional W : Φˆ→ R as W (σF ) , V (xF ) with xF ∈ X
and δxF ∼ δF and σF is given by Eq. (A.1). To see that W is uniquely defined,
assume δF ∼ δxF ∼ δyF , then W (σF )=V (xF )=V (yF )=W (σF ). To conclude we
need to show that σF = σG implies δF ∼ δG . To see this, notice that Claim 1,
Claim 4 and Claim 5 of De Oliveira et al. (2014) hold in our setting. Then, W is
well-defined.
Lemma 3. W is monotone (with respect to point-wise order) and normalized. It
is convex if and only if< satisfies PERU.
Proof. Of Lemma 3. Monotonicity follows from the definition of W . The con-
stant functions in Φˆ are those taking values in u(X ) = R. To see normaliza-
tion, take x ∈ X , then W (σx)= u(x)=σx by definition. To see convexity, for all
σF ,σG ∈ Φˆ and all α ∈ (0,1), PERU implies
αδF ⊕ (1−α)δG < δαF+(1−α)G ⇐⇒
αV (F )+ (1−α)V (G)≥V (αF + (1−α)G) ⇐⇒
αW (σF )+ (1−α)W (σg )≥W (σαF+(1−α)G )=W (ασF + (1−α)σG )
Since W is convex, continuous and normalized, by Proposition 2, W is also
translation invariant.
To sum up, W is a monotone, normalized, convex and translation invariant
functional, by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2014, Prop. 2) it is a niveloid. By the prop-
erties in section AppendixA and Claim 7 and 8 of De Oliveira et al. (2014), W
can be rewritten as
W (σF )= max
pi∈Π(pˆ)
∫
∆(Ω)
max
f ∈F
(∫
u ◦ f d p
)
pi(d p)− c(pi)
where c :Π(pˆ)→ [0,∞] is given by
c(pi)= sup
F∈A
[(∫
u ◦ f d p
)
pi(d p)−W (σF )
]
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This concludes the proof of part a).
For part 2., the fact that a SL representation implies the axioms is trivial. For
the converse direction, ITRU clearly implies DITRU, hence Lemma 1 holds. We
can define W and V as in the proof of Theorem 1. To prove the result we need
to show that our axioms imply Axiom 9 in De Oliveira et al. (2014). Suppose that
δF ∼ δG , by Ex-ante Independence, γδF ⊕ (1−γ)δH ∼ γδG⊕ (1−γ)δH for all H ∈
A . By ITRU, δγF+(1−γ)H ∼ δγG+(1−γ)H . Taking H =G , we have δγF+(1−γ)G ∼ δG .
Applying (De Oliveira et al., 2014, Prop. 7) we have the result.
Proof. Of Corollary 1. The fact that CIA implies the axioms is straightforward.
To prove the other implication, we follow the proof of Theorem 1. First, we
prove that WDI, together with the other axioms, implies the independence ax-
iom over degenerate menus. Suppose δ f ∼ δg , by PERU and Ex-ante Indepen-
dence, δ f < δα f +(1−α)g . By WDI, δα f +(1−α) f < δα f +(1−α)g implies δαg+(1−α) f <
δαg+(1−α)g = δg . By PERU and Ex-ante Independence again, δg < δαg+(1−α) f ,
hence δ f ∼ δg ∼ δαg+(1−α) f . Therefore, Lemma 1 holds. To prove that each
F ∈A has a certainty equivalent, notice that finiteness of F and ofΩ imply the
existence of a best b ∈ X and worst outcome w ∈ X such that δb < δF < δw .
By Continuity, there exists αˆ ∈ [0,1], such that δF ∼ αˆδb ⊕ (1− αˆ)δw . By PERU,
δF ∼ αˆδb ⊕ (1− αˆ)δw < δαˆb+(1−αˆ)w . Suppose, by contradiction, that αˆδb ⊕ (1−
αˆ)δw Â δαˆb+(1−αˆ)w , then αˆV (b)+ (1− αˆ)V (w) > V (αˆb + (1− αˆ)w). By Lemma
1, αˆu(b)+ (1− αˆ)u(w) > u(αˆb + (1− αˆ)w), contradicting affinity of u. Hence,
δF ∼ αˆδb ⊕ (1− αˆ)δw ∼ δαˆb+(1−αˆ)w .
The rest of the proof is identical to the one of Theorem 1.
Before proving Proposition 1, notice that ∂V (F ) is equal to the subdifferen-
tial of W (σG ) (see De Oliveira et al., 2014).
Proof. Of Proposition 1. (1.) implies (2.). Assume pi∗ ∈ ∂W (σF )∩∂W (σG ) 6= ;,
by the definition of subdifferential
W (σ)≥W (σF )+〈σ−σF ,pi∗〉 and W (σ)≥W (σG )+〈σ−σG ,pi∗〉 (B.1)
for all σ ∈C (∆(Ω)). Then, choosing σ=σG in the first inequality and σ=σF in
the second gives:
W (σF )−W (σG )= 〈σF −σG ,pi∗〉 (B.2)
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Now, takeσ=ασF +(1−α)σG for someα ∈ (0,1) and plug it into the right-hand
side of Eq. (B.1), then
W (ασF + (1−α)σG )≥W (σG )+α〈σF −σG ,pi∗〉
=W (σG )+α (W (σF )−W (σG ))
=αW (σF )+ (1−α)W (σG )
where the first equality follows from Eq. (B.2). The reverse inequality follows
from convexity of W .
(2.) implies (1.) Assume 2. and, by contrapositive, ∂W (σF )∩∂W (σG )=;. Take
pi ∈ ∂W (ασF + (1−α)σG ), it is non-empty by Ergin and Sarver (2010b, Lemma
2.5), then pi ∉ ∂W (σF ) or pi ∉ ∂W (σG ) by the initial assumption, so W (σF ) ≥
〈σF ,pi〉−W ∗(pi) and W (σG )≥ 〈σG ,pi〉−W ∗(pi) and one of these inequalities must
be strict. Then, for all α ∈ (0,1):
αW (σF )+ (1−α)W (σG )>α〈σF ,pi〉+ (1−α)〈σG ,pi〉−W ∗(pi)
=〈ασF + (1−α)σG ,pi〉−W ∗(pi)
=W (ασF + (1−α)σG )
a contradiction to (2.) and where the last equality follows from pi ∈ ∂W (ασF +
(1−α)σG ).
Proof. Of Theorem 2. 1. implies 2. By contrapositive, assume 1. and the ex-
istence of F,G ∈A such that ∂V2(F )∩∂V2(G) = ; and ∂V1(F )∩∂V1(G) 6= ;. By
Prop. 1 and PERU, ∂V2(F )∩∂V2(G)=; impliesαδF⊕(1−α)δG Â2 δαF+(1−α)G . By
Prop. 1, ∂V1(F )∩∂V1(G) 6= ; implies αV1(F )+ (1−α)V1(G)=V1(αF + (1−α)G),
a contradiction to 1.
2. implies 1. By contrapositive, assume 2. and the existence of F,G ∈A and
α′ ∈ (0,1) such that α′δF ⊕ (1−α′)δG Â2 δα′F+(1−α′)G and δα′F+(1−α′)G <1 α′δF ⊕
(1−α′)δG . By PERU, the last becomes α′δF ⊕ (1−α′)δG ∼1 δα′F+(1−α′)G . This is
equivalent to α′V1(F )+ (1−α′)V1(G) = V1(α′F + (1−α′)G), by Prop. 1, the last
equality must be true for allα ∈ (0,1). Therefore,α′δF⊕(1−α′)δG ∼1 δα′F+(1−α′)G
implies ∂V1(F )∩∂V1(G) 6= ;. However, α′δF ⊕ (1−α′)δG Â2 δα′F+(1−α′)G implies
∂V2(F )∩∂V2(G)=;, a contradiction to 2.
AppendixB.1. Calculations for Example 1.
From the analysis of positively homogeneous functionals of Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2011a), it is immediate to see that V (F ), seen as a functional W : C (∆(Ω))→
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R, is quasi-convex (hence it satisfies AR), positively homogeneous and it is not
translation invariant. It is convex (hence it would satisfy PERU), if and only
if, c1 ≤ c2, see (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011a, Prop. 6). To see DITRU, consider
f , g ∈F . Then:
V (γ f + (1−γ)g )= max
pi∈Π(pˆ)
[((∫
γ
∫
u( f )d p+ (1−γ)∫ u(g )d p)pi(d p))+
c1(pi)
−
((∫
γ
∫
u( f )d p+ (1−γ)∫ u(g )d p)pi(d p))−
c2(pi)
]
By the property of each signal in Π(pˆ) and the condition on the information
cost functions, V (γ f + (1−γ)g )= γ∫ u( f )d pˆ+ (1−γ)∫ u(g )d pˆ. Which is equal
to the value of γδ f + (1−γ)δg .
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